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Abstract
We propose a new mechanism to achieve coordination through voting, for which we discuss
a number of real-life applications. Among them, the mechanism provides for a new theory
for downsizing in organizations. A crisis may lead to a decrease in the willingness to cooper-
ate in an organization, and therefore to a bad equilibrium. A consensual downsizing episode
may signal credibly that survivors are willing to cooperate, and thus, it may be optimal and
efficiency-enhancing (for the individuals remaining in the organization), as the empirical evi-
dence suggests. A variation of the same mechanism leads to “efficient” upsizing. (JEL: C70,
D70, M50)
1. Introduction
It is often the case that a group can improve upon a dysfunctional status quo if
its members undertake activities with positive feedback loops. That is, they must
engage in activities such that the profitability of an action increases when others
are also taking it (also known as actions with strategic complementarities).1 This
kind of situation normally leads to multiple equilibria. Therefore, improving upon
the status quo requires that agents align expectations about others’ actions in the
right way, so that the improving equilibrium is indeed implemented.
The aim of this paper is to describe a mechanism that guarantees that expec-
tations are correctly aligned, and that we argue is pervasive in the real world. The
mechanism requires that agents facing a bad status quo collectively approve an
action which is costly for the whole group. This action only yields benefits in the
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game with strategic complementarities if the right equilibrium is implemented.
Thus, only agents who intend to implement the improving equilibrium will sup-
port such action. It is the act of voting on a costly action that operates as an
equilibrium selection device by providing a credible behavioral signal of the
intention to cooperate.
There are a number of real-life phenomena that can be accounted for by this
costly voting mechanism combined with an ensuing coordination game. These
range from firms’ downsizing practices to scapegoating, among others. Although
we focus on corporate downsizing in our analysis, we first briefly describe some
alternative applications of the mechanism.
An episode in the conquest of Mexico in the early sixteenth century offers a
first example. In 1519, Hernán Cortés and 600 Spaniards landed on the coast of
Mexico. The ships that brought them from Cuba were then purposefully destroyed.
According to Bernal Díaz del Castillo (1984, ch. 58), who accompanied Cortés
in his trip, this was done as a means to avoid “occasions for internal dissension”
during the battles to follow against the Aztec empire.2 Díaz del Castillo, in fact,
says that although Cortés had already thought about this, he wanted the initia-
tive on this measure to come from his men.3 Destroying the ships is, clearly, a
costly action, and the ensuing victorious military campaign can be read as a sign
of good internal harmony and coordination among the Spanish troops.4 Going
from the particular to the general, most constitutions give the power to declare
war to the legislative, rather than the executive, branch of government. For exam-
ple, Article 1, section 8, of the American Constitution states, “The Congress
shall have Power to declare war,” even though Article 2, section 2, says, “the
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States.”5
The critical account of scapegoat episodes throughout both history and liter-
ature by Girard (1982) offers another example of this mechanism at play.6 Girard
starts by noticing that prior to the scapegoat episode there is often a crisis and
a breakdown of cooperation in the societies where they occur. The scapegoat
2. “Y no quedasen ocasiones, porque entre tanto que estábamos la tierra adentro no se alzasen otras
personas como los pasados.” (ch. 58, p. 215, emphasis in the original).
3. “El mismo Cortés lo tenía ya concertado, sino que quiso que saliese de nosotros.” The extent to
which the decision to destroy the ships was indeed collectively settled is debated (Reynolds 1959).
For our purposes, it suffices that enough people have thought that both the action and consultation
with the men were a good idea.
4. This historical episode has been interpreted as an example of the value of commitment (Schelling
1960). In our view, without consultation there is still a bad equilibrium where the ship is not destroyed,
as coordination is not expected after the destruction. So we argue that it is the combination of a bad
outcome and consultation that turns weakness to strength.
5. Just to provide two more examples, the present Spanish Constitution (Article 63.3), as well as
the French one (Article 35), also require direct parlimentary approval for the declaration of war.
6. As a matter of fact, a good deal of inspiration for our paper (and the starting point for this
research) was obtained by reading Girard (1982).
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episode, he argues, serves then as a way for society to regain cooperation. The
collective dimension of scapegoating episodes together with the arbitrary nature
of this act of violence corresponds to the costly voting stage of our model that
helps to implement the desirable cooperative outcome. Girard also notices that
scapegoats are often characterized by a mark, which distinguishes them for the
rest of society. This differentiating mark plays the role of a focal point that serves
to coordinate on them as the victims, something missing from our model (because
it is unnecessary).
The application of this mechanism goes beyond these, admittedly impor-
tant, sociopolitical examples. We now turn our attention to a clearly economic
phenomenon, which will be the focus for the remainder of this paper. This phe-
nomenon is the reduction in the number of members of the organization, also
called downsizing.
In this paper we propose a new theory to explain downsizing, based on the
mechanism previously outlined, whereby organization members vote and then
undertake a costly action, followed by a coordination game.
Many activities within firms involve strategic complementarities. As Milgrom
and Roberts (1995) argue, these complementarities are one of the main reasons for
the existence of firms.7 Suppose that, for some reason, members of an organization
start to entertain doubts about the ability to coordinate of some of its fellow
members. Then, it is rational for everybody in the organization to undertake any
action whose payoff is less sensitive to coordinating with others. As a result,
productivity decreases and there is a common loss. An obvious solution to this
corporate problem is to expel the initiators of this negative feedback loop. This
by itself would be a reason for downsizing. But notice that in the critical stage
no one in the organization is cooperating, so the parties initiating the loss of
coordination may not be easy to locate. They are simply doing what everybody
else does. And even if the initiators of the loss of cooperation were easy to locate,
there is no guarantee that, after reorganization, the remaining members would in
fact cooperate again, as expectations need not be aligned any more.
We call strategic downsizing a process by which the organization collectively
decides whether to implement a restructuring plan. We show that strategic down-
sizing can restore cooperation in the streamlined organization. This might occur
even if the individuals who are laid-off are not the initiators of the breakdown in
coordination. Our result relies on two crucial assumptions: reorganization can be
costly, but it can be profitable as well.8 We discuss costs and benefits separately.
7. “[S]trong complementarities make it more likely that [. . .] central strategic direction will be
valuable” (Milgrom and Roberts 1995, p. 190). Kreps (1990) has also argued that the alignment of
expectations is crucial in organizations, and may be the rationale for a “corporate culture.” See also
Crémer (1993) and Lazear (1995) on other perspectives of corporate culture.
8. In the remainder of this paper, when we talk about the benefits of corporate downsizing, we refer
to the benefits accruing to those individuals who remain a part of the organization after downsizing.
Cabrales and Calvó-Armengol Corporate Downsizing and Team Spirit 1019
Let us first focus on the possibility for gains, and why they cannot be real-
ized without downsizing. In our game a cooperative action can be individually
profitable, but this is true only if most people also take that action. Suppose now
that a shock to the economy, sector, or firm opens new possibilities outside of the
organization for some of its members.9 These people are unwilling to coordinate
with the rest of the group, so cooperation is doomed as the size of the organi-
zation becomes large. Indeed, the probability that not enough members take the
cooperative action becomes very large. However, in a smaller organization, the
probability of not encountering enough cooperators can be sufficiently reduced
so that cooperation is viable. Downsizing is, thus, necessary for cooperation.
Note, however, that a firm may do the reorganization and find itself in a bad
equilibrium anyway. Here is where the potential cost for downsizing becomes
important. Suppose that, besides the potential benefit previously described from
potential cooperation, downsizing has a certain cost. For instance, there may be
increasing returns to scale in organization size. Assume that the members of
the organization are consulted on whether the reorganization should take place.
Because downsizing without cooperation is assumed to be costly, supporting the
reorganization is only reasonable for a member who plans to cooperate after
reorganization. Thus, the approval of downsizing is a signal that its supporters
are ready to cooperate in the streamlined organization. This is the mechanism
that coordinates expectation, and thus ensures coordination. In a sense, the pub-
lic approval and the potential cost of downsizing are a sufficient condition for
cooperation.
We also show that, besides its ability to achieve coordination through down-
sizing, a similar mechanism of collective approval can lead to “efficient” upsizing.
At this point, it is worth reviewing some stylized facts on downsizing. Oulton
(2000) shows that the productivity is negatively correlated with size changes in a
study of British manufacturing firms. Foster, Haltinwanger, and Krizan (2001) has
the same type of finding for American retail-trade firms. A natural explanation
for this would be technological. If technology has decreasing returns to scale,
downsizing would imply a gain in productivity. For this reason, it is interesting
to turn to a study by Barnes and Haskel (2001, Table 4) for a sample of British
manufacturing firms since they decompose the effect of productivity between
upsizing and downsizing firms. They show that, for firms that downsize, the
proportion whose productivity increases can be between 2 and 5 times higher than
those whose productivity decreases depending on the period. Interestingly for us,
the same qualitative finding is true for firms that upsize.10 It is important also
9. For instance, they may start an active on-the-job search.
10. Baily, Bartlesman, and Haltiwanger (1996) analyze plant level data in the U.S. manufacturing
sector and conclude that “increased employment as well as productivity contribute almost as much
to overall productivity growth in the 1980s as the plants that increased productivity at the expense
of employment” (p. 1).
1020 Journal of the European Economic Association
to note that not all downsizing is a response to decreases in demand (Chadwick,
Hunter, and Walston 2004).11 This body of evidence is consistent with a picture
of firms mostly in the increasing returns part of the cost curve that downsize to
recover coordination, as we posit in our model.
A large amount of literature in management deals with the costs and benefits
of downsizing. There is no widespread consensus, neither from the theoretical nor
from the empirical perspective, on whether the actual effects of downsizing on
productivity are positive or negative. For example, on the positive side Theorell
et al. (2003) show that the rate of long-term sick leave, a key productivity indicator,
decreased after downsizing in Swedish hospitals. Amabile and Conti (1999), on
the other hand, show that downsizing is often detrimental for creativity, although
this depends on the circumstances and the negative effects typically decrease over
time.
The efficiency-inducing properties of voting in our mechanism are also sup-
ported in the available data. Bassi and Van Buren (1997) show evidence that
“involving employees in a downsizing process tend to produce positive outcomes”
(p. 39). Also, management advisors typically recommend to effectuate a restruc-
turing in a transparent and consensual manner (see, e.g., Borgen 2000). In most
European countries it is mandatory to consult with workers when developing
downsizing plans.12
Our mechanism for equilibrium switching requires that agents avoid domi-
nated strategies, and that they realize that others will do so as well. It is legitimate
to question whether this selection process is empirically relevant. The answer is
likely to be positive. On the one hand, only two rounds of deletion of dominated
strategies are required. This does not seem to pose such stringent demands on
the common knowledge of rationality. Furthermore, and very importantly, the
available experimental evidence is mostly positive for games that share similar
features with ours. The equilibrium selection problem can be divided, in a broad
sense, between games where there is no distributional conflict (the equilibria are
Pareto-ranked) and those games where different agents prefer different equilibria.
In our case, the agents agree on which is the desirable equilibrium outcome. It
turns out that the available experimental evidence in games that share this feature
supports the behavioral relevance of forward induction (see, e.g., Van Huyck,
Battalio, and Beil 1993; Broseta, Fatás and Neugebauer 2003; and the discussion
in Section 3 of Brandts, Cabrales, and Charness 2006).
11. “Firms, however, may also reduce jobs even in environments in which demand is robust, seeking
increased operating efficiencies” (Chadwick, Hunter, and Walston 2004, p. 405).
12. For example, in the U.K., “[I]n non-unionised sectors, those with more than 20 employees must
embark on a 30-day consultation with a body of elected workers’ representatives. Companies with
more than 100 employees require a 90-day consultation period.” Financial Times (London), October
28, 2002, p. 20.
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The mechanism that induces cooperation in our paper is connected to for-
ward induction, as in the papers of Van Damme (1989) and Ben-Porath and Dekel
(1992). In Ben-Porath and Dekel, the potential for self-sacrifice is sufficient to
obtain the desired outcome, whereas in our game the sacrifice has to be effec-
tive. To understand this difference, let us sketch the argument in Ben-Porath and
Dekel. They consider a coordination game where, in addition, one player (and
only one) is given the possibility to undertake a costly action (call it “burning
money”). For this player, burning money and then playing the action leading to
his worst equilibrium outcome is weakly dominated. Thus, burning money signals
the intention to obtain his favorite equilibrium. But then, even if he does not burn
money, he will obtain his favorite equilibrium payoff (as otherwise he would burn
money). In our model, in the original organization, and given the players’ beliefs,
only one equilibrium outcome can be sustained. Our costly action (downsizing)
does not guarantee per se a better equilibrium (unlike in Ben-Porath and Dekel).
However, if the organization is downsized, for the same beliefs, it now faces an
equilibrium selection problem. The (costless) collective choice procedure then
solves the equilibrium selection problem with forward-induction type arguments
(voting yes and then not cooperating is weakly dominated). So, in our model,
the effective sacrifice creates an equilibrium selection problem, which is solved
by bringing the sacrifice to collective approval. In Ben-Porath and Dekel, on the
other hand, the equilibrium selection problem is a given, which the potential for
sacrifice then solves.
Section 2 describes the model, and the results are presented in Sections 3
to 8. Section 9 discusses the related literature and concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Productive Technology
An organization produces output in a way that depends both on the size of the
organization and its members’ productive actions. We denote by ui(a1, . . . , an; n)
the individual payoff of a current member i of an organization composed of n
members where member k takes action ak . This payoff equals her marginal pro-
ductivity (net of effort costs). We suppose that ui is multiplicatively separable in
the vector (a1, . . . , an) of productive actions and in the size n of the organization;
that is,
ui(a1, . . . , an; n) = hni (a1, . . . , an)F (n).
The size effect function,F(n), common to all organization members, is assumed to
be increasing for some range [0, n¯]. This reflects increasing returns to scale (thus
increasing marginal productivity) of production output to organizational size,
at least below a critical organization size. The function hni (a1, . . . , an) reflects
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complementarities of efforts between members of the organizations; it depends
on the number of team members and on their actions profile. This is the kind of
complementarity to which Kreps (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1995) refer.
For simplicity, there are only two productive actions for each member. The
productive action space for member i is Ai = {0, 1}, where ai = 1 represents
the option to contribute to an activity which enhances productivity (cooperative
action), andai = 0 represents the option not to contribute (noncooperative action).
For any productive action profile (a1, . . . , an), let a = ∑ni=1 ai be the total
number of contributors. The productive action effect varies across members in
the following way:
hni (ai, a−i ) =
{
τn(a) if ai = 1,
1 if ai = 0.
The individual return to choosing the noncooperative action ai = 0 is constant
(and equal to one) irrespectively of the choice made by other members.13 The
return to the cooperative action ai = 1 depends on the productive action profile
as it varies with the total number of contributors.
The return to the cooperative action is represented by a nondecreasing func-
tion τn : {1, . . . , n} → R. In words, the returns to cooperation increase (weakly)
with the number of cooperators. Consider now two teams of different sizes m > n.
We further assume that τm(m − k) ≥ τn(n − k), for all k ≤ min{n,m}. In other
words, given a fixed number of noncooperators k, the returns to cooperation are
non-decreasing in team size.
2.2. The Dilution of Team Spirit
The team spirit of an organization is reflected in the profile a of productive actions
taken by its members. Organizations with a sufficiently high proportion of mem-
bers choosing ai = 1 display a high team spirit, which translates into higher per
capita payoffs for members building actively such team spirit.
Suppose now that, at some point in time, all members in the organization
acquire the belief that, with some probability µ, each member i sticks to action
ai = 0, irrespectively of any other factor. This may be due to a shock to the econ-
omy, sector, or firm, which changes the payoff structure outside of the organization
for some of its members. Think of the cooperative action as a firm-specific task
providing no benefits outside the current organization. For some members, the
13. The results would be essentially unchanged if noncooperators were able to “enjoy” part of the
efforts of cooperators. That is, if we had hni (0, a−i ) = τ
¯
n(a), with τn(a) increasing more rapidly
with a than τ
¯
n(a), and also with τ
¯
n(0) > τn(0). A rationalization for the lower rate of increase of
τ
¯
n(a) could be a probability of detection/punishment changing with a.
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shock could generate profitable outside opportunities. Then, for these players,
the time spent undertaking the cooperative action can be more profitably used
by exploring actively these outside opportunities. Formally, for all these people,
the productive action effect becomes h˜ni , where h˜
n
i (0, a−i ) > h˜
n
i (1, a−i ) for all
a−i . For these players, it is a dominant strategy to play ai = 0, and we set
h˜ni (0, a−i ) = hni (0, a−i ) = 1. The probability µ is, then, the ex ante probability
assigned by all individuals in the organization to this event.
We refer to the members with this kind of behavior as pathological individ-
ualists and denote the set of members with this behavior by PI . Members in PI
do not take part in team building activities under any circumstances. Prior to the
revelation of their private type, the expected output for a member i that plans to
choose action ai = 114 when every other player plans to choose ai = 1 (if in the









µj(1 − µ)n−1−j τ n(n − j). (1)
2.3. The Corporate Downsizing Game
Initially, an organization is composed of a set N of members.
The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, all organization members
participate in the corporate downsizing procedure. This is a collective choice
process that we model through (several variations of) a voting game. Then, at
an interim stage, a nature move determines the players’ types. Each organization
member has a probability µ of belonging to PI; this is independent and identical
across members. In the second stage, the remaining members in the organization
choose their productive actions according to their types.
We have assumed at this point, for expositional simplicity, a common prior
and revelation of information after downsizing is decided upon. This allows us
to exclude the complexity of signaling-type phenomena at the downsizing stage.
We later show that the basic thrust of the results still holds under a more natural
informational assumption.
We now analyze the game for different scenarios about the first stage pro-
cedure. In each scenario we characterize the strategy profiles that survive two
rounds of deletion of weakly dominated strategies (and thus are subgame-perfect
equilibria) of the downsizing game. Let us be a bit more precise.
14. Note that, if player i ends up being a pathological individualist once private types are revealed
to players, she will not follow this intended plan of action and rather, given her type, select and stick
to the non-cooperative alternative ai = 0.
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Remark 1. In the remainder of the paper, statements about rounds of deletion of
weakly dominated strategies mean that in every round all players simultaneously
eliminate all their dominated strategies.
3. Approving or Rejecting an Elimination
One common procedure for corporate downsizing requires the membership to
approve or reject the elimination of a certain subgroup. Here, we look at the case
where the candidate subgroup is exogenously given: Section 5 considers the case
where the subgroup is endogenous.
There is a candidate subgroup C for elimination. Each individual i ∈ N casts
a positive or negative vote on the elimination of C. The choice of C is exogenous
to the approval procedure. Either the CEO or perhaps an outside consultant makes
the proposal. The final decision is taken by k−majority voting, that is, for the set
C to be eliminated, at least k players have to vote for the elimination.15
Let c be the cardinality of C. Define also
H ∗ = min{H(p) | k ≤ p ≤ n − c}.
Notice that this minimum value depends on the size of majority approval size k
and the beliefs µ.
Proposition 1. Suppose that
(1 − µ)H ∗ + µF(n − c) > F(n) > H(n). (2)
In all strategy profiles that survive two rounds of deletion of weakly dominated
strategies, all players i ∈ N\{C ∪ PI} vote for elimination of C and then choose
ai = 1 after the elimination.
Proof. First, observe that for all i /∈ C approving the elimination and then choos-
ing ai = 0 is weakly dominated by not approving the elimination and then
choosing ai = 0. Indeed, the expected payoff for player i /∈ C when nobody is
eliminated and she chooses ai = 0 is F(n). The payoff for player i /∈ C when C is
eliminated and she chooses ai = 0 is F(n− c), and F(n− c) < F(n).16 Because
casting a vote for the elimination of C by any player i /∈ C may be pivotal for
this elimination, given the requirement of k−majority approval, the domination
follows. Thus, any player who votes for the elimination of C will play ai = 1 if
15. The “yes/no” voting procedure over two alternatives we adopt here rules out issues of strategic
voting or cycling patterns.
16. Note that, if in the interim stage i ∈ PI , then ai = 0 by our assumption on the behavior of
pathological individualists.
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in the interim stage i /∈ PI . Therefore, a lower bound for the expected payoff in
case of elimination is given by (1 − µ)H ∗ + µF(n − c).
Second, because F(n) > H(n) is equivalent to F(n) > (1 − µ)H(n) +
µF(n), it is dominant to choose ai = 0 when nobody is eliminated. The condition
(1−µ)H ∗+µF(n−c) > F(n) guarantees that the player i /∈ C prefers (ex ante)
the situation where C is eliminated. Because casting a vote for the elimination of
C by any player i may be pivotal for this elimination, it is dominant to vote for
this elimination (and then choose ai = 1).
Therefore, with exogenous candidate subgroups, downsizing is approved and
members remaining in the organization (excluding pathological individualists)
choose the cooperative action. Note, incidentally, that expelled members need not
necessarily be pathological individualists, as this trait is not known at the time of
deciding whom to exclude (or private information, in the more general setting we
explore later). The collective decision to downsizing thus unfairly harms some
organization members, just as scapegoats are unfairly blamed for problems of any
kind. Here, as in Girard’s theory, arbitrary scapegoating reestablishes cooperation.
The mechanism through which downsizing helps to enhance efficiency has
two essential parts.
First, downsizing reduces the probability that an organization contains a large
enough group of PI-types that would make cooperation impossible, even for well-
disposed non-PI individuals. To make this point clearer, consider the extreme
case where all individuals have to cooperate in order for the “good” cooperative
outcome to be effective, and that this yields very high returns τn(n)  1. Without
downsizing, the probability of having at least one PI in the organization (and thus
foregoing the high payoff τn(n)) is 1−(1−µ)n. Suppose instead that downsizing
takes place and that c individuals are expelled. This probability then decreases to
1 − (1 − µ)n−c, which translates into higher expected gross benefits. Of course,
downsizing comes at a cost F(n− c)−F(n) < 0. However, downsizing seems a
good way to achieve efficiency (for individuals not in the expelled group) as long
as this cost is small enough compared to the benefit, that is,
τn(n)[(1 − µ)n−c − (1 − µ)n] > F(n) − F(n − c).
Very importantly, this argument carries over to more general environments, as
we show below with two examples. In particular, we do not have to assume that
cooperation is rewarding only if everyone cooperates.
Second, notice that the previous argument does not guarantee that downsizing
would lead to a more efficient situation. Indeed, the coordination game of the
reduced organization still has multiple equilibria, and the surviving members of
the downsized organization could rationally refuse to cooperate. This is where
the second part of the mechanism helps. Given our assumption of increasing
returns in organization size, downsizing entails a cost F(n − c) − F(n) borne
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by all members of the downsized organization. Because of this cost, no rational
agent would approve the downsizing if she were intending not to cooperate. So a
favorable vote on downsizing acts as a credible behavioral signal that the voter
intends to cooperate after reorganization takes place. Because reorganization can
be beneficial if enough people cooperate, and because a positive vote signals
a willingness to cooperate, everybody will approve the downsizing and non-PI
members will cooperate after reorganization.
This discussion allows us to interpret the sufficient conditions for downsizing
stated in Proposition 1, namely, the two inequalities in equation (2). First, at least k
and at most n−c members have approved reorganization (or else it would not have
occurred) and therefore intend to cooperate if they turn out not to be PI , yielding
a lower bound on expected payoffs equal to H ∗ = min{H(p) : k ≤ p ≤ n − c}.
Note that the event in which they are not PI is random and this explains why the
binomial terms in the expression for H(p) in (1) are needed. Second, given that
the individual may still turn out to be a PI , the lower bound in expected payoffs is
a weighted sum of H ∗, which bounds what she gets when not PI , and F(n − c),
which she gets when PI . When (1−µ)H ∗ +µF(n− c) > F(n), it is better to be
in a downsized organization than not cooperating in the original one. Finally, the
condition F(n) > H(n) guarantees that members do not cooperate in the original
organization.
4. Two Classes of Coordination Payoff Functions
We now show that the two inequalities in equation (2) can hold simultaneously
for two classes of functional forms relating to coordination payoffs. We also
determine the optimal size of the expelled group and work out in the examples
its main comparative statics.
In what follows, we set the size effect function to F(n) = n.
4.1. Threshold Games
Suppose that the returns to coordination are represented by a nondecreasing step
function such that τn(a) = 0 for all a < n − κ and τn(n) > 1. In words,
the cooperative action yields nonzero returns whenever at most κ members in
the organization choose not to contribute. The function τn(a) is nonzero for
a ∈ {n − κ, . . . , n}, a support of size κ .17 This kind of payoff function is a
generalization of the O-ring production function, originally proposed by Kremer
17. More generally, the maximum numbers of noncooperators κ compatible with positive returns
to cooperation could vary with the size n of the group. All of our qualitative conclusions would still
hold.
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(1993), and which has been used in a large number of empirical and theoretical
works.18
According to (1), the expected individual payoff when everybody plans to








µj(1 − µ)n−1−j τ n(n − j).
We have argued above that there must be, at least, the possibility of enhanced
profits for cooperation in a downsized organization. In other words, H(n) must
be decreasing in n, at least over some range. Because F(n) is increasing, a nec-
essary condition for this is that the remaining term h(n) is decreasing in n over
some range. As established below, it turns out that a sufficient condition for this
monotonicity to arise with a step function τn is µn ≥ κ . In other words, if the
expected number of PI-types (µn) is larger than the maximal number (κ) that
can be present in the organization without spoiling cooperation, then a reduction
in the organizational size can be beneficial.
Lemma 1. Suppose that µn ≥ κ . Then, h(n) is decreasing in n.
Proof. Recall that, by assumption, τn(a) = 0 for all a < n−κ , and τn+1(a) = 0
for all a < n + 1 − κ . Then we have





















τn+1(n + 1 − k)
]
.
If the term in brackets is nonpositive for all 0 ≤ k ≤ κ and negative for some







= n − k
n
,
this condition is equivalent to
µ ≥ 1 − n − k
n
τn(n − k)
τn(n + 1 − k) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ κ,
18. Over 330 citations in Google Scholar on August 2006. See Heywood and Jirjahn (2004) and
Mirza and Nicoletti (2004) as examples of two recent papers in very different fields who take the
O-ring production function as the basis of their empirical work.
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Table 1. Optimal scapegoat size as a function of n, κ , and µ.
(n; κ) µ = 0.10 µ = 0.15 µ = 0.20 µ = 0.25 µ = 0.30 µ = 0.35
(50; 5) 7 22 24 24 24 24
(50; 10) 0 0 10 18 23 24
(100; 10) 20 47 49 49 49 49
(100; 15) 0 20 40 49 49 49
(100; 20) 0 0 20 36 46 49
with a strict inequality for some 0 ≤ k ≤ κ . Given that τn(·) is nondecreasing in
n, a sufficient condition for this last inequality to hold is that µ ≥ κ/n.
We now turn to the issue of what is the optimal size of the expelled group for
the class of step functions. More precisely, suppose that the decision to downsize
is taken by majority approval, that is, k = n/2+1 if n is even, and k = (n+1)/2
if n is odd. To simplify matters, take a step function τn(·) such that τn(a) = 0 if
a < n − κ , and τn(a) = τ otherwise.19 Table 1 computes the optimal scapegoat
size of Proposition 1 for different values of n, κ and µ.
A few things are interesting to note. First, the optimal scapegoat size is weakly
increasing in the probability µ. That is, the higher the likely number of patho-
logical individualist, the (weakly) bigger the size of the expelled group. Second,
the values for the optimal scapegoat size range from 0 to n/2 − 1, which is the
biggest size that can be expelled by majority approval.20 The cells with zeros
correspond to µn < κ , when the expected number of pathological individual-
ists is lower than the provision point κ . When µn ≥ κ , absent downsizing and
given that pathological individualists always choose not to contribute, individual
returns would always be zero irrespective of the choices of ai . Given such bad
prospects, downsizing is collectively approved and the optimal scapegoat size
is 0 < c∗ ≤ n/2 − 1. The upper bound n/2 − 1 is obtained with bad enough
prospects, that is, with high enough values for µ.21,22
19. The actual value of τ is left unspecified and is fixed for each value of n, κ, µ so that the
equilibrium existence in Proposition 1 conditions hold true for some c.
20. More precisely, the highest scapegoat size than can be expelled is equal to n/2 − 1 when the
population size n is even, as in the numerical examples of Table 1. If instead n is odd, the highest
possible scapegoat size is equal to (n − 1)/2.
21. Formally, denote by [(n − 1)/2] the highest integer smaller or equal than (n − 1)/2. Majority
rule requires that the optimal size c∗ maximizes h(µ, n − c) on {0, 1, . . . , [(n − 1)/2]}. Consistent
with Proposition 3, (see Section 6.2) c∗ = 0 when µn < κ . When µn ≥ κ , c∗ is an “interior” point
(i.e., 1 ≤ c∗ < [(n − 1)/2]) for low values of µ, and c∗ = [(n − 1)/2] when µ is high enough.
22. When the optimal scapegoat size is equal to n − k, this “optimum” is constrained by the k-
majority approval rule. This could lead to a temptation to repeat the downsizing, and may even
unravel the downsizing process. Without the possibility of commitment, one could assume that only
the members not included in C could vote on C exclusion.
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4.2. Smooth Payoff Functions: An Analytic Example
Assume τn(k) = τβk−n, where β, τ > 1. Thus, τn(k) is an increasing and convex
function of the number k of contributors.23
Using (1), the expected return from the cooperative action when everybody





+ 1 − µ
)n−1
F(n) = ταn−1n,
where α = µ/β + (1 − µ) < 1 for all 0 < µ < 1.
We discuss the comparative statics on the optimal size of the expelled group.
Let c be the size of the expelled group. The equilibrium payoff in Proposition 1
is now G(n − c) = (1 − µ)ταn−c−1(n − c) + µ(n − c), and the optimal size of
the expelled group solves
n − c∗ ∈ arg max{G(n − c) : n − k ≤ n − c ≤ n}.
It is fairly obvious that the optimum c∗ sometimes coincides with k (as we saw
in the previous example). We focus instead on the comparative statics of interior
solutions.
At an interior optimum we haveG′(n−c∗) = 0 andG′′(n−c∗) ≤ 0. As usual,
we determine the comparative statics of c∗ with respect to the exogenous payoff
parameters by differentiating the first-order optimality condition with respect to
τ, β and µ, and by using the implicit function theorem.









that is, c∗ and τ move in the same direction. This is because a higher τ increases
the benefits of coordination, and thus the losses incurred by having PIs in the
group.
We now analyze the impact of β, the marginal returns to cooperation. Routine
algebra leads to ∂c∗/∂β ≥ 0 if and only if





With n large, this condition boils down to the coordination multiplier in the
downsized organization, ταn−c∗−1, being higher than the odds of being a PI ,
23. Notice that τm(m − k) = τβ−k = τn(n − k), for all m > n, so that all the assumptions on the
returns to coordination are satisfied.
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µ/(1 − µ). Thus, everything else equal, a high value of τ or a low value of µ
make it more likely that the optimal size of the expelled group increases with
β. This is because a higher β increases the benefits of coordination and thus the
losses incurred by having PIs in the group.24
Finally, we analyze the impact of the probability µ to become a PI on the
optimal size of the expelled group. Again, when n is large, ∂c∗/∂µ ≥ 0 if the
odds of being a PI are low enough compared to the returns to cooperation, for
example, when ταn−c∗−1 > µ/(1 − µ).
It is clear from the previous calculations that the value of µ is important in
determining the sign of the impact of β and µ on the optimal size of the expelled
group, as well as the level of the impact of τ on this size. There is a simple
heuristic argument that makes this clear.
The expected payoff from downsizing is (1 − µ)H(n − c) + µF(n − c).
This is the weighted sums of equilibrium payoffs for the PI and for the non-PI
individual.
For the PI , who does not care about cooperation and obtains F(n− c) in the
downsized organization, the optimal value for c is zero.
For the non-PI , who does care about cooperation, the optimal size of the
expelled group maximizes H(n− c). At an interior optimum, this optimal size is
−1/ ln a, an increasing function of µ and β.
The overall optimal value of c solves the tension between the two optimal
values for the PI and for the non-PI , and how this tension is actually solved
depends on the relative weight of being a PI versus a non-PI type, given by the
odds µ/(1 − µ). When these odds are small, the optimal size of the expelled
group inherits the properties from the non-PI optimum, and the effect of µ and β
are positive. How big or small this ratio needs to be is determined by the relative
payoffs accruing to both types, which is τan−c∗−1.
5. Endogenous Expelled Group
Let’s now endogenize the choice of the set C. Prior to the approval or rejection
of C, the members of the organization must choose a person who will propose
the set to be subject to the approval/rejection process.
Corollary 1. Consider any collective choice procedure that selects a delegate
to make the proposal of C, and suppose that k+c ≤ n. Then the delegate proposes
a candidate C which maximizes H(n − c). In all strategy profiles that survive two
24. This is similar to the effect of τ , except that there is now a counteravailing effect, because
increasing β makes more costly a given decrease in the size of the expelled group (notice that β
affects both the level and the slope of the reduction costs).
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rounds of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, all players i ∈ N\{C ∪ PI}
vote for elimination of C and choose ai = 1 after the elimination.
Proof. Once a delegate is chosen, Proposition 1 characterizes the behavior
she expects for all proposals. Therefore, the delegate will propose a set C
(not including herself) which maximizes H(n − c), thus her expected payoff
(1 − µ)H(n − c) + µF(n).25
Downsizing does effectively rebuild team spirit even when the scapegoat is
endogenously selected. The selection, here, consists of a two-stage procedure
whereby members first choose a representative who then proposes a candidate
subgroup for elimination to their approval. Note that the collective choice proce-
dure for the selection of the representative is left unspecified, implying that the
result holds with a huge variety of institutional arrangements.
6. The Case of Unmediated Downsizing
We now consider the general case where the scapegoat is endogenously and
directly selected by organization members, without resorting to representatives.
We contemplate a voting procedure where members do not simply cast a yes/no
vote between two given alternatives. Rather, they vote over the precise identity of
each member to be expelled. This potentially opens the door to strategic behavior
during the voting stage.
6.1. Coordination Problems in Unmediated Downsizing
The corporate downsizing procedure involves all initial members of the orga-
nization. Each member submits a list of individuals to be expelled from the
organization. We denote by N the set of initial members of the organization
and by Si ⊆ N the list submitted by member i. The case Si = ∅ corresponds to
i submitting a list with no names.
Given a collection of submitted lists S = (S1, . . . , Sn), a collective choice
procedure determines the group E(S) that is actually expelled. E(S) is selected
the following way. If there is a unique groupS′ that receives the (absolute) majority
of votes, then E(S) = S′. In all other cases, E(S) = ∅. We denote by e(S) the
cardinality of E(S).
25. Note that the delegate is not in PI when choosing the candidate subgroup to elimination as
types are defined at the interim stage between the voting stage and the contribution stage, that is,
after the choice of C by the delegate.
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Proposition 2. Suppose H(n − e(S)) > F(n) > H(n). In all strategy profiles
that survive two rounds of deletion of weakly dominated strategies where E(S) =
∅, all players i /∈ PI such that Si = E(S) choose ai = 1.
Proof. We first show that F(n) > H(n) implies that, for all i /∈ PI , submitting a
list Si = ∅ and not contributing whenever Si is eliminated is a weakly dominated
strategy. Consider the following strategy for player i: submit a list Si = ∅, then
after some history where Si is eliminated, ai = 0 (we do not need to specify the
full strategy). Consider an alternative strategy that behaves as the previous one
after all histories, expect that it submits Si = ∅. We show that the latter dominates
the former.
First note that the expected payoff of a player when nobody is eliminated
and she chooses ai = 0 is F(n). The payoff for player i ∈ N\{E(S) ∪ PI}
when E(S) = ∅ is eliminated and she chooses ai = 0 is F(n − e(S)), and
F(n − e(S)) < F(n). Note also that F(n) > H(n) implies that it is dominant to
choose ai = 0 when nobody is eliminated.
Consider now some list of submissions S−i . We distinguish two cases. First,
player i’s choice is pivotal. If she votes Si = ∅ then E(Si, S−i ) ∈ {Si,∅}, whereas
if she votes Si = ∅ then E(∅, S−i ) = ∅. Thus, the payoff accruing to i is never
lower under the second strategy and is strictly higher when E(Si, S−i ) = Si .
The alternative case is trivial. The choice of i is not pivotal, and behavior (thus
payoffs) after all histories is the same for both strategies.
Once agents know that every non-PI individual will contribute when their
submitted list of players is eliminated, the result follows from the fact that H(n−
e(S)) > F(n) implies that payoffs are higher with and without elimination.
This shows that approving to downsize the organization is a possibility, but,
unlike in the centralized case, it is not the only reasonable possibility.26 Indeed,
the lack of a centralized proposer adds a different coordination problem to be
collectively solved, namely, identifying the group to be expelled. But because the
pressure to switch from a bad equilibrium to a good one is large, a focal point
could be used to choose a group to be eliminated. As we already discussed, Girard
(1982) argues that scapegoats have a mark, which distinguishes them for the rest
of society. This could serve as the focal point. However, a focal point may not
solve the problem optimally, because the group identified for elimination may be
larger or smaller than the one maximizing H(n − c). In reality, firms typically
have a policy for layoffs, most usually the last hired are the first to be laid off.
Another intriguing possibility, which we explore in the following subsection more
formally is that history can serve to efficiently focus expectations.
26. In fact, it is an iteratively undominated equilibrium outcome both to have no downsizing as
well as “suboptimal” downsizing.
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6.2. Learning Dynamics or an Algorithm for Efficiency
The preceding discussion leaves open the possibility that a fully decentralized
downsizing procedure may lead to suboptimal equilibrium allocations. One could
think that this scarcely matters, because we have shown in Proposition 1 that a
choice through a delegate already reaches the maximum organizational output.
There may be circumstances, however, where the direct route would be better.
We have not considered, for example, the case where delegates are corruptible—
which could get in the way of the delicate belief-coordinating process.
Given these possibilities, is there any way to justify a fully decentralized
downsizing? Suppose all agents are sufficiently strategically savvy to behave as
in Proposition 2, but they have more trouble guessing at the particular way others
will vote, and have to learn their way through equilibrium by a trial-and-error
process. More specifically, we assume that agents play the game repeatedly. Each
individual starts by playing some arbitrary (pure) voting-strategy (as we said
before, they still behave as in Proposition 2 after the voting stage). Before each
repetition of the game, they have an opportunity to change their vote with some
probability. The dynamics of voting will be fully described when one identifies the
transition probabilities between strategies. Instead of fully describing the process,
we enumerate a set of assumptions that are sufficient for the results of the paper.
D1. The transition probabilities depend exclusively on the present voting profile.
D2. One individual, chosen at random, is given the chance to update her vote
every period.
D3. If the individual is given the chance to update her strategy, and she does not
already enjoy the maximal possible payoff in the game, any vote that best
responds to the present voting profile is adopted with positive probability.
D4. If the individual already enjoys the maximal possible payoff in the game,
she changes her vote with zero probability.
These assumptions permit us to obtain clear-cut results in a relatively simple
fashion. Assumption D1 simplifies the analysis by making the strategy profile of
a certain period the state variable of the system, but it is not essential for the results.
It would suffice if the system had a finite memory, for example. Assumption D2
is necessary because the voting game is such that except when voters are pivotal,
any vote is a best response. The fact that every vote is a best response, coupled
with assumption D3, would make it impossible to find any stable outcome, as all
voters could simultaneously switch to anything else and destroy the stability of
any outcome.
Assumptions D3 and D4 are designed to exploit a special characteristic of
the voting game. While an agent is not pivotal, she can change her vote while
choosing a best response. This easily leads to a situation in which someone is
pivotal. At that point only votes that are “efficient” are taken.
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Properties D1 to D4 make our dynamics similar to the ones in Kim and
Sobel (1995). Assumption D2 corresponds to their assumption (I), Assumption
D3 corresponds to their assumption (BR), assumption D4 to their assumption
(NL). Our dynamics are also closely related to the ones in Hurkens (1995) and
Gilboa and Matsui (1991).
Proposition 3. Let SC be any set of voting profiles which leads to a set of
eliminated individuals C that maximizes H(n − c), let C be the union of all such
sets, and let SC = ∪C∈CSC. Given dynamics that satisfy properties D1, D2,
D3, D4:
(a) If S(0) is such that S(0) ∈ SC, then, for all C ∈ C, Pr(for some t′ : S(t) ∈
SC∀t ≥ t′) > 0.
(b) Pr(for some t′: S(t) ∈ SC ∀t ≥ t′) = 1.
Proof. To prove (a) we have to look at a number of cases:
Case 1. Suppose that S(0) is such that nobody is eliminated and nobody
can change the majority. Note that all votes are a best response because none
changes the outcome, and because nobody is eliminated, no player obtains the
highest payoff. Then, by assumptions D2 and D3, there is positive probability of a
sequence of one period moves where all members of the population sequentially
change their vote to Si = ∅ so that we end up in a state of the population
where Si(t) = ∅, for all i. Then, from that state and for any C∗ ∈ C, there
is, by assumptions D2 and D3, a positive probability that all members of N\C∗
get sequentially a chance to vote and they choose Si = C∗, which is a best-
response even when this means a change in state from not eliminating anybody
to eliminating C∗. Once S(t) is such that C∗ ∈ C is eliminated, no member of
N\C∗ changes her vote, by D4.
Case 2. Suppose that S(0) is such that set C∗ /∈ C is eliminated. Then by
assumptions D2 and D3, there is a positive probability of a sequence of one
period moves where all members of the population sequentially change their vote
to Si = C∗ so that we end up in a state of the population where Si(t) = C∗, for
all i. From that point, there is a positive probability of a sequence of one period
moves where all members of the population sequentially change their vote to
Si = ∅ so that we end up in a state of the population where Si(t) = ∅, for all
i. The only thing needed for this to work is that the person in the sequence who
changes from a majority voting to eliminate C∗to a ∅-eliminating majority is an
agent i ∈ C∗. Once in state Si(t) = ∅, for all i we can apply the same reasoning
as in Case 1.
Case 3. Suppose that S(0) is such that nobody is eliminated and some agents
can change the majority to eliminating set C∗. Then by assumption D2, one of
the agents i already voting for C∗ gets to move and changes her vote to Si = ∅.
From that point on we are in a situation like Case 1.
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Case 4. Suppose that S(0) is such that set C∗ ∈ C is eliminated, and that the
number of players voting in favor of the elimination of C∗ which belong to N\C∗
is l ≥ k. Then none of those players will ever change their votes and Si(t) = C∗
for all t .
Case 5. Suppose that S(0) is such that set C∗ ∈ C is eliminated, and that the
number of players voting in favor of the elimination of C∗ which belong to N\C∗
is l < k. Then by assumptions D2 and D3, there is a positive probability of a
sequence of one period moves where l − k members of N\C∗ not voting already
for C∗ change their vote to Si = C∗. From that point on, we can apply the same
reasoning as in Case 4, and the state will always be Si(t) = C∗ after that time.
Cases 1 through 5 exhaust all the possible cases to show part (a), so (a)
follows. To establish part (b), notice that part (a) establishes that from any S(t)
there is a lower bound ε > 0 on the probability of reaching SC , and staying
there forever in a number of steps smaller than some fixed and finite η. So the
probability of not reaching SC in ηn steps is bounded above by (1−ε)ηn. Because
limn→∞(1 − ε)ηn = 0, part (b) follows.
7. A Different Timing for Type Revelation
The timing of type revelation may be seen as somewhat awkward in the game
we just presented. One could perhaps expect that individuals knew whether they
were PI at the time of voting, and not just when choosing whether to cooperate. It
is not completely clear, however, that this is clearly the best assumption, as there
is substantial evidence (Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter 2003) and theorizing
(Santos-Pinto and Sobel 2005) about the importance of self-image for economic
agents, and voting as a PI could negatively affect the individual’s self-image in a
way that actually acting as a PI would not. Nevertheless, we will now see that the
results are very similar when one uses the alternative assumption that individuals
know their type at the time of participating in the collective decision scheme.
We assume that collective choice procedures are anonymous, in the sense
that voting or related activities will be secret. So agents will only know how
many others are in favor or against different options, not who is it that favors
them. Besides being realistic, this trait would help true revelation of information.
If voting were not secret, a PI-type would be concerned that signalling his type
through voting would expose her to exclusion from the organization.
In addition, we assume that the participants will only be informed about
whether the proposal was passed or not. This is not quite as realistic, but the
alternative provides the opportunity for much more conditioning of actions by the
workers on the results of voting, and hence the possibility for strange equilibria to
arise. We feel that those equilibria are probably unreasonable, but cannot give a
more formal rebuttal, whereas under the assumption we use, the results are sharper,
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and it is still a feasible mechanism, which gives it, at a minimum, normative
relevance.
The belief that other individuals are PI is now dependent on the history of
play. Let N be the outcome of voting under which C is not eliminated. Denote
by π the cardinality of PI , by p(· | N ) the posterior distribution over the size of
PI and by p0(·) the prior distribution over π , which depends on µ.
With this we can now proceed to review our results.
Proposition 4. Assume that τ n−c(k)F(n − c) > F(n) > H(n). In all strategy
profiles that survive two rounds of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, all
players i ∈ N\{C ∪ PI} vote for elimination of C and choose ai = 1 after the
elimination.
Proof. Notice that for PI types it is always dominant to reject an elimination.
Indeed, their payoff after elimination is F(n − c), which is smaller than F(n),
the payoff without elimination, and their vote may be pivotal.
We will now show that non-PI types choose to eliminate and then cooperate
when τn−c(k)F (n − c) > F(n) > H(n). First, voting to eliminate and then
choosing ai = 0 is dominated for the reasons we have mentioned in other cases.
Therefore, we are left to show that voting not to eliminate cannot be optimal when
τn−c(k)F (n − c) > F(n) > H(n). We proceed in a number of steps.
Step 1. After observing an elimination, the distribution of the number of
PI-types is a first-order stochastically dominating shift over the prior distribution.
Proof of Step 1. Denote by ρS the cardinality of the number of non-PI players
who decide not to cooperate after observing the outcome N under strategy profile
S. Given such strategy profile S, let P be the corresponding probability that the
outcome is N . Let m = n − k and pi0 = p0(π = i). For x ≤ m, we have that
p(π ≤ x|N )
=
∑x
i=0 pi0P(ρS + i ≥ m + 1)∑x
i=0 pi0P(ρS + i ≥m+ 1)+
∑n−k





i=0 pi0P(ρS + x ≥ m + 1)∑x
i=0 pi0P(ρS + x ≥m+ 1)+
∑n−k
























pi0 = p0(π ≤ x),
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where the first inequality follows because the function x1/(x1 + x2 + x3) is
increasing in x1, and decreasing in x2, and we have substituted P(ρS +i ≥ m+1)
in the positions corresponding to x1 and x2 by something respectively bigger and
smaller.
Step 2. The payoff for a non-PI-type for cooperating after observing the
rejection of an elimination is bounded above by H(n).
Proof of Step 2. Given that PI-types do not cooperate, the best possible
case for cooperation is when all non-PI types cooperate. Thus the payoff for
cooperation is bounded by
∑n
i=0 p(π = i|N )τn(n− i)F (n). We know by Step 1
that p(π = i|N ) is a first-order stochastically dominating shift over p0(π = i).
Because τ(n − i) is a monotonic function, this implies (Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green 1995, definition and proposition 6.D.1), that the payoff for cooperation
is bounded by
∑n
i=0 p0(π = i)τn(n − i)F (n) = H(n).
Step 3. When F(n) > H(n), cooperating for a non-PI after observing N is
not optimal.
Proof of Step 3. F(n) is the payoff for cooperating after N , and H(n) is an
upper bound to the payoff under cooperation, by Step 2.
Step 4. When τn−c(k)F (n− c) > F(n), voting for the elimination of C (and
then choosing ai = 1 after elimination) is weakly dominant if all players avoid
the use of weakly dominated strategies.
Proof of Step 4. Indeed, when C is eliminated, at least k players cast the yes
vote. Then, τn−c(k)F (n−c) is a lower bound for players in C∪PI that contribute
after C is eliminated.
With this we can now proceed to the following result, analogous to
Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. Consider any collective choice procedure that selects a delegate
to make the proposal of C and suppose that k + c ≤ n. Then, if the delegate is
not of a PI-type, she proposes a candidate C which maximizes the ex ante payoff
of all i ∈ N\{C ∪ PI}.
8. The Optimal Size of the Organization
We have uncovered a mechanism that supports optimal downward reorganiza-
tions. Could something similar work in the upward direction? If so, we would be
closer to having a complete theory of firm size in our context. At the risk of out-
stretching our arguments, we can say that under certain technological conditions
this may be indeed so.
Suppose that there are two organization sizes n∗ > n such that τn∗(n∗)
F (n∗) > τn(n)F (n). So the size n∗ is more efficient than n. The initial size
is n, and the organization would like to increase its size to n∗. Now assume
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that τn(n)F (n) > F(n∗). In words, the cooperative outcome in the smaller
organization is more profitable than the noncooperative outcome in the larger
organization. Notice that this assumption is weaker than that required in Proposi-
tion 1 for successful downsizing from n∗ to n, so the same (stronger) assumption
can be used for both downsizing and upsizing. In addition we will require that
τn
∗
(k)F (n∗) > τn(n)F (n), that is, only k cooperators (in general smaller than
n∗), are needed for cooperation to be profitable in the larger organization.27
Suppose, in addition that there are no PI-types in this environment (so µ = 0).
As in the case of corporate downsizing, upsizing requires k-majority approval.
Now we will show that if it is common knowledge that all members of the initial
organization cooperate, a k-majority vote on the hiring of n∗ − n new members
for the organization will lead to an organization of the increased, more efficient,
size, where everybody will cooperate.
Proposition 5. Suppose that initially we have an organization N of size n, where
ai = 1, for all i ∈ N. If τ n∗(k)F(n∗) > τ n(n)F(n) > F(n∗) then, in all strategy
profiles that survive two rounds of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, all
players i ∈ N vote for hiring the n∗ − n new members, and all members of the
enlarged organization N∗ choose to contribute, that is, ai = 1, for all i ∈ N∗.
Proof. First, observe that for all i ∈ N approving the enlargement and then
choosing ai = 0 is weakly dominated by not approving the enlargement and then
choosing ai = 1. The payoff without enlargement is τn(n)F (n) by the assumption
that at the initial sizen, all individuals chooseai = 1. The payoff after enlargement
when choosing ai = 0 is F(n∗). Because casting a vote for the enlargement may
be pivotal for this enlargement, and τn(n)F (n) > F(n∗), the domination follows.
Thus, any player who votes for enlargement will play ai = 1. Therefore a lower
bound for the expected payoff for any i for the choice of ai = 1 in case of
enlargement is given by τn∗(k)F (n∗). The condition τn∗(k)F (n∗) > τn(n)F (n)
guarantees, then, that the player i ∈ N prefers the situation where the organization
is enlarged. Because casting a vote for the enlargement by any player i may be
pivotal for this enlargement, it is dominant to vote for this elimination (and then
choose ai = 1).
Where does this leave us? It is not too difficult to see that by iterating the
argument in the proposition above there are technological conditions under which
repeated consensual enlargements (starting with a size of 1, when cooperation is
guaranteed) could lead to an organization of optimal size where all members
cooperated. This organization could be buffeted by shocks leading to the loss
27. Given earlier assumptions, this will happen provided the increase in organization size from n
to n∗ is not too large, and the majority required for enlargement k is sufficiently large.
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of cooperation (the appearance of PI-types). Downsizing could then lead to a
recuperation of the culture of cooperation. After that, the organization could
regain once more its optimal size by consensual enlargement.
9. Discussion and Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that downsizing can have efficiency-enhancing
effects in organizations, by focusing expectations on the cooperating outcome.
Our results rely on two basic ingredients. One is the view that firms exist to gen-
erate synergies and solve the coordination problems these synergies induce. The
other important element is the fact that collective choices can “signal” intended
plans of action. One could perhaps question the necessity of such a cumbersome
and centralized mechanism as “voting” about downsizing in a modern organiza-
tion. It would seem, perhaps, as effective to merely have players make a promise to
choose the high action. We have two answers for this question. First, the “voting”
can be merely an informal “consultation,” decentralized to divisional managers.28
All that is important is that the outcome of this process is common knowledge
and believed to be nonmanipulated. Second, the alternative “written promise”
preserves the bad equilibrium if it is not enforceable. And it is not enforceable, if
it is not verifiable, which seems to us the natural application of our setting. Think
of the organization as a bank that provides a variety of services to a business
customer. The customer is only satisfied if the loan officer, the risk analyst, the
account manager, and the mergers advisor all provide timely and friendly service.
But if he is dissatisfied and goes to the competition, it may be very difficult to
know who is really guilty. The customer may not tell the bank’s division manager
of the reason for his decision, or he may not really know (the account manager
may have been late with his proposal because the risk analyst did not cooperate
with him in his efforts).
Seminal papers on coordination in firms are Kreps (1990) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1995). Downsizing in our model has the property that it induces people
to believe that others will play the high payoff (but risky) action. In this sense it
acts in the way that Kreps envisioned (good) corporate culture (see also Crémer
(1993) and Lazear (1995). Our mechanism, though, is different from the one in
that paper, which relied mostly on experiences shared by organization members
to coordinate beliefs on the right action. Here, by contrast, a shared experience
of cheating induces people to believe that a large enough number of pathological
individualists are present in the organization. Only the downsizing event will
change those beliefs for the good.
28. In fact, formal consultation of downsizing with workers (often in workers’ councils) is
mandatory in most European countries, as we discussed in the Introduction.
1040 Journal of the European Economic Association
Demange (2004) has also studied how organizations choose their structure
as a way to induce coordination. Her approach is quite different to ours. She
has studied the problems created in organizations which need to coordinate deci-
sions of the whole group, in a context where subgroups (coalitions) are assigned
decision powers beyond those of individuals. In that context she has shown that
hierarchical organizations induce the highest possible level of stability, at the time
that efficiency is preserved.29
The relationship between scapegoats and organizations has also been studied
by Winter (2004). He studies the incentive effects in a team-production problem
carried out by a hierarchy of selecting certain individuals for punishment in case
of an organizational failure. The mechanism design problem consists of finding
the best possible structure of punishments for a given organization.
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